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In 1984 a director of a Delaware corporation occupied a
prestigious position, well-protected from personal liability arising from actions one might take as a director. He was shielded
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initially by the business judgment rule, by which courts gave
deference to the policy and business management decisions of
businessmen.' He probably was indemnified by his corporation
for the expense of defending and paying settlements or judgments in actions brought against him in his capacity as a director.2 In addition, the corporation protected him from liability

not covered by indemnification by purchasing director and officer ("D&O") liability insurance.3 This insurance was comprehensive and relatively cheap. In 1984 the typical D&O policy for
a medium-sized corporation ($100-250 million in corporate assets) cost $19,339, 4 provided $16.6 million of coverage, 5 and carried a total deductible of $44,626.6
Since 1984, that has changed. While most states have enacted statutes allowing corporations to eliminate a director's
personal liability to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages resulting from the director's gross negligence, 7
and several states have expanded their corporate indemnification statutes,8 a corporate directorship has become nonetheless

1. See generally D. BLOCK, N. BARTON, & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS (1987) [hereinafter BLOCK].
2. See infra text accompanying notes 76-118.

3. In 1984 more than 90% of companies with assets in excess of $100 million had
D&O insurance. THE WYATT COMPANY, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS AND FIDUCIARY LIABILITY
SURVEY 49 (1987) [hereinafter WYATT SURVEY]. (References to the Wyatt Survey
throughout this note refer to the portion of the survey related to U.S. corporations.)
4. The premium cost of $19,339 to a $150-250 million company in 1984 is based on
an average policy limit of $16.6 million, WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 57, and a premium cost on a $10 million policy of $11,650. Id. at 97. ($11,650 x 1.66 = $19,339).
These figures and others that follow are cited primarily for comparison purposes,
and occasionally, when gaps in the Wyatt Survey are apparent, a rational, but unscientific, extrapolation is necessary to derive the appropriate figure. Also, the numbers used
are averages and cannot account for the specific insurance risks-or lack thereof-that
any particular company might have. In addition, although the Wyatt Survey is the best
resource currently available for evaluating D&O insurance, it is, nonetheless, only a survey, and as such reflects merely the responses of participating companies.
5. WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 57.

6, The deductible in a D&O policy typically is divided between the personal coverage side of the policy and the corporate reimbursement side. See infra text accompanying notes 129-34. In the case of a medium sized corporation the aggregate personal deductible (i.e., the maximum personal deductible for claims against all directors or
officers) was approximately $11,304. WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 81. The corporate
reimbursement deductible was $33,322. Id. at 82.
7. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986); Hanks, DirectorLiabil-

ity: 35 States Act To Limit Liability of Directors, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1988, at 20.
8. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (Supp. 1986) (expanding indemnification
statute to comport with the Aronson gross negligence standard); Mo. ANN. STAT. §

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss3/7

2

Cottingham: The D & O Insurance Crisis: Darkness at the End of the Tunnel

1988]

D&O

INSURANCE CRISIS

655

"The Job Nobody Wants" 9 because D&O insurance has become
more difficult to acquire, 10 and its cost has skyrocketed. The
$19,339 policy mentioned above would now cost $243,011.11 Instead of a $44,626 deductible, it would now carry a total deductible of $295,195.12 Despite these gargantuan increases in premiums and deductibles, the policy would likely exclude coverage of
liability arising from pending or prior litigation, environmental
damage, failure to maintain insurance, and the payment of
bribes or kickbacks; and, although less likely, the policy might
also contain exclusions relating to such critical matters as mergers, tender offers, and securities transactions.1 3 This is a staggering change to occur in three years.14
This Note begins with a brief description of the events contributing to this rapid transformation and then evaluates the
current status of and relationship between the three primary

351.355(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (allowing indemnification of settlements paid in shareholder derivative suits); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 721 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (making
statutory indemnification not exclusive of indemnification that might be provided for
directors and officers in certificate of incorporation or bylaws).
9. Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 8, 1986, at 56; see also Business Struggles to Adapt as Insurance Crisis Spreads, WALL ST.J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 31,
col. 5.
10. The Wyatt Survey reports that 51.5% of the responding companies in its 1987
survey experienced difficulty securing coverage. WYATr SURVEY, supra, note 3, at 161.
There are indications, however, that the "availability crisis," not to be confused with the
"cost of premium crisis," has abated somewhat. See id; Slater, Companies Beginning To
See Signs That the Insurance Crisis Is Easing, WALL ST.J., Aug. 26, 1986, at 27, col. 4;
cf. Hilder, Risky Business: Liability Insurance Is Difficult To Find Now for Directors,
Officers, WALL ST.J., July 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
11. This figure is based on the 1987 average policy limit of $12.5 million, WYATT
SURVEY, supra note 3, at 57, that would cost $125,386 (The cost of a $10 million policy is
$100,309. Id. at 97. So by multiplying $100,309 by 1.25 one should get at least an approximation of what a $12.5 million primary policy would cost), plus an excess premium of
$117,625. This excess premium must be added to compensate for the drop in the primary
coverage to $12.5 million. The 1984 average policy limit was $16.6 million, so the $4.1
million difference ($16.6 - $12.5 = $4.1) must be paid at the "excess premium" rate,
which in 1987 was $28,689 per million. Id. at 103. ($28,689 x $4.1 = $117,625). By comparison, the 1984 excess premium cost was $948 per million. Id.
12. The average of the personal aggregate deductibles for these medium sized companies in 1987 was $30,568, WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 81, and the corporate reimbursement deductible was $264,627. Id. at 82. ($30,568 + $264,627 = $295,195).
13. Id. at 68, 69. All of the exclusions listed here are in addition to the "standard"
D&O exclusions. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
14. The figures discussed in the text for medium sized companies (i.e., 100 to 250
million in assets) are exhibited below for smaller (i.e., $25 million in assets) and larger
(i.e., $2 billion in assets) companies.
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sources of director protection-limited liability statutes, indemnification statutes, and D&O insurance. Following -this discussion is an attempt to rationalize the apparent anomaly discussed
above, to determine why rates continue to be inflated, and to
speculate about the prospects for D&O rates in the future.
II.

BACKGROUND

In 1968 Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr. stated that "[tihe
search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations
have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncompliSmaller Corporations

1984

Coverage
Premium
Deductible

$6.1 million
$8,877
$30,066

Larger Corporations

1987
$6.1 million
$60,318
$130,375

1984

1987

Coverage
$48.6 million
$48.6 million
Premium
$94,996
$2,296,824
Deductible
$127,092
$1,527,780
These figures, subject to the limitations of the Wyatt Survey set forth in supra note 4,
were derived as follows:
A. Smaller Corporations
1. Policy Limit (coverage)
a. 1984: $6.1 million, WYArr SURVEY, supra note 3, at 56.
b. 1987: For comparison purposes the same policy limit ($6.1 million) is being
used here for the 1987 figures. The average policy limit, however, had
in fact dropped to $5.0 million.
2. Premium
a. 1984: A $5 million policy cost $7,276, id. at 97, so a $6.1 million policy cost
approximately $8,877 (1.22 x $7,276 = $8,877).
b. 1987: The 1987 policy limit shrank to an average of $5 million. Id. at 57.
Primary coverage for $5 million was $30,530. Id. at 97. Excess
coverage for the additional $1.1 million of coverage (6.1 -5.0 = 1.1)
at a rate of $27,080 per million, id. at 103, was $29,788. So the total
premium was $60,318 ($30,530 + $29,788 = $60,318).
3. Deductible
a. 1984
i.
Aggregate personal deductible: $10,084, id. at 81.
ii. Corporate reimbursement deductible: $19,982, id. at 82.
iii.

b.
i.
ii.
iii.

Total:

$30,066

1987
Aggregate personal deductible: $19,417, id. at 81.
Corporate reimbursement deductible: $110,958, id. at 82.
Total: $130,375
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cated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of
needles in a very large haystack."15 He found "little precedent
for liability even for the kind of Merovingian supineness for
which directors were held liable in the old bank cases."' 6 By
1988, however, several enormous needles have effectively eradicated the haystack of prior case law, and a plethora of litigation,
spawned by the frenetic merger and acquisition activity of the
late seventies and early eighties, has altered the corporate
landscape.
The most notable, and noted,1" case in which directors and
officers have been found liable for a breach of the duty of care is
Smith v. Van Gorkom.'8 The case is subject to extraordinarily
B. Larger Corporations
1. Policy Limit
a. 1984: $48.6 million, id. at 57.
b. 1987: For comparison purposes the same policy limit ($48.6 million) is
being used here for the 1987 figures. The average policy limit,
however, had in fact dropped to $41.3 million.
2. Premium
a. 1984: A $25 million policy cost $48,866, id. at 98, so a $48.6 million policy
cost $94,996 (1.944 x $48,866). Obviously, this is a very rough method
of estimation, and is useful only for comparison purposes.
b. 1987: The 1987 policy limit shrank to an average of $41.3 million. Id. at 57.
Primary coverage for $41.3 million was roughly $2,130,837 (based on
$1,289,853 for $25 million of coverage, id. at 98). Excess coverage for
the additional $7.3 million (48.6 - 41.3 = 7.3) at a rate of $22,738 per
million, id. at 103, was $165,987. So the total premium was $2,296,824
(2,130,837 + 165,987 = 2,296,824).
3. Deductible
a. 1984
i.
Aggregate personal deductible: $16,513, id. at 81.
ii.
Corporate reimbursement deductible: $110,579, id. at 82.
iii.

b.

Total:

$127,092.

1987
i.
ii.

Aggregate personal deductible: $47,974, id. at 81.
Corporate reimbursement deductible: $1,479,806, id. at 82.

iii.

Total:

$1,527,780.

15. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnificationof
CorporateDirectors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968).
16. Id. at 1101.
17. See, e.g., Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985); Kirk, The Trans Union Case: Is It Business as Usual?, 24 A.
Bus. L.J. 467 (1986-87). A collection of articles related to the Van Gorkom decision can
be found at 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405-568 (1985).

18. 488 A.2d 858 (1985).
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divergent characterizations, depending upon which facts one
chooses to emphasize. The following is a very brief synopsis of
the facts of the case19 and a discussion of the opposing viewpoints regarding the propriety of the court's decision.
In Van Gorkom the court found nine directors and officers
of the Trans Union Corporation personally liable for approving
the sale of the corporation at less than its intrinsic value.20 The
notion to sell the corporation apparently originated with the
company's chairman, Jerome Van Gorkom, who was a sizable
shareholder of Trans Union and who was approaching sixty-five
years of age and mandatory retirement. After consulting briefly
with Trans Union's chief financial officer about the feasibility of
a leveraged buyout of Trans Union in the range of $50-$60 per
share, Van Gorkom met privately with corporate takeover specialist Jay Pritzker to discuss the outright sale21 of the company.
With virtually no negotiation or bargaining, Pritzker agreed to
buy the company at Van Gorkom's suggested price of $55 per
share. Van Gorkom agreed to allow Pritzker to purchase one
million shares of treasury stock at $38 per share and acceded to
Pritzker's demand that the deal be consummated over the
course of the upcoming weekend.
Van Gorkom called a special meeting of the Trans Union
board to consider the proposed sale. Nine of the ten directors,
including five "outside" 2 2 directors, were present at the meeting
and approved the sale of the company at $55 per share, based
upon a twenty minute oral presentation by Van Gorkom, a supporting statement by the company's president, and a discussion
among the board members lasting less than two hours.
Judge McNeilly, in dissent, characterized the Trans Union
board of directors as a highly qualified and informed group of

19. For a complete discussion of the facts upon which this synopsis is based, see id.
at 864-70.
20. The Delaware Supreme Court found the directors and officers liable for gross
negligence. Id. at 873-74. The question whether the amount received in the sale of Trans
Union was less than its intrinsic value was remanded to the court of chancery. Id. at 893.
Following the supreme court decision the case was settled with the approval of the court
of chancery for $23,500,000. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, 679 (3d ed. 1986).

21. The actual transaction was a merger, but the effect of the deal, for present purposes, was as if the company were sold.
22. For a relevant discussion of outside directors, see Pease, Outside Directors:
Their Importance to the Corporationand Protectionfrom Liability, 12 DEL J. CORP. L.
25 (1987).
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"professional business men." Collectively, the five "inside" directors had worked for the company for 116 years and had
served for a total of 68 years as directors. Similarly, the five
"outside" directors represented 78 years of experience as chief
executive officers and 53 years of service as Trans Union directors. According to Judge McNeilly, "[t]hese men knew Trans
Union like the backs of their hands and were more than well
qualified to make on the spot informed business judgments concerning the affairs of Trans Union, including a 100% sale of the
corporation."2 3 In addition to the approval of the transaction by
the board of directors, the plan was overwhelmingly accepted by
the Trans Union shareholders four and a half months later. During the interim the board was able to receive bids from other
parties but could not actively solicit bids.
The effectiveness of the above procedure in acquiring a fair
price for the company is subject to debate. Van Gorkom and the
board of directors failed to make a probing study of the $55
price. The Company's chief financial officer, in fact, opined that
the price was too low.2" Neither Van Gorkom nor any member of
the board of directors actually read the Pritzker agreement
before approving it. The company was severely limited by this
agreement and subsequent amendments thereto in its ability to
solicit higher bids, and Van Gorkom apparently even rebuffed a
legitimate attempt by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. to top
the Pritzker bid.25 The only other serious attempt to exceed the
$55 bid was made by General Electric Credit Corporation and
was thwarted by the nature of the agreement with Pritzker.26
The shareholders were less informed than the directors with respect to the appropriateness of the $55 price,27 so their approval
provided little empirical support for the price paid. Also, the
court focused on the board's diligence prior to their approval of
the bid, so the shareholders' approval, coming months after the
board's action, was of limited consequence.
Much of the commentary generated by the case has been
23. 488 A.2d at 5, 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 867, n.6.
25. Id. at 882-85.
26. Id. at 870, 885.
27. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors failed to disclose to the
shareholders all material information such as a reasonable stockholder would consider
important in deciding whether to approve the Pritzker bid. Id. at 893.
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negative. One prominent commentator described the decision as
"surely one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate
law."12s The critics have assailed the Delaware court for imposing
staggering personal liability on the Trans Union directors in a
case involving no fraud or self dealing and in which the court
refused to evaluate the fairness of the price received for the
company.29 The court focused its attention solely on the decision
making process of the board, effectively ignoring the $55 per
share price received for the company, a price that represented 3 a
48% premium over the market price of the stock at the time. 1
Other commentators, however, characterize the case as an
unremarkable application of existing Delaware law.31 They contend that the court was compelled to reach its ultimate result,
based upon the egregious factual context of the case.
Whether the members of the board of directors of Trans
Union under the circumstances of this case were guilty of gross
negligence is a question that could be discussed at great length.
For the purpose of this Note, however, one need only recognize
that the court, rightly or wrongly, imposed liability for monetary
damages on individual defendants for their decision to sell a
company with which they were intimately familiar for a price
that substantially exceeded the market price of the company's
stock. The directors' ultimate liability of $23.5 million understandably sent shockwaves through both the insurance industry
and the executive suite.3 2

28, Fischel, supra note 17, at 1455.

29. For reviews critical of the decision, see id.; Baldo, Delaware Rocks the boat,
FonBs, Apr. 8, 1985, at 126; Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the
Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985).
30. 488 A.2d at 869 n.9. The trial court stated:
[T]he merger price offered to the stockholders of Trans Union represented a
premium of 62% over the average of the high and low prices at which Trans
Union stock had traded in 1980, a premium of 48% over the last closing price,

and a premium of 39% over the highest price at which the stock of Trans
Union had traded any time during the prior six years.

Id.
31. Schwartz & Wiles, Trans Union: Neither "New" Law Nor "Bad" Law, 10 DEL.

J. CORP. L. 429, 430 (1985); see also Prickett, An Explanation of Trans Union to "Henny
Penny" and Her Friends, 10

DEL.

J.

CORP.

L. 451 (1985) (written by attorney for the

plaintiffs in Smith v. Van Gorkom).
32. Van Gorkom was not the only case of its kind. See, e.g., Fox v. The Chase Man-

hattan Corp., No. 8192-85, slip op. (Del. Ch. Jan. 9, 1986) (court approved settlement of
$32.5 million); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., No. C85-396R (W.D. Wash.
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Even before the Delaware Supreme Court issued the Van
Gorkom opinion, several D&O insurers had withdrawn from the
market. 3 Following Van Gorkom, the remaining carriers lowered
their policy limits, raised premiums and deductibles, and expanded exclusionary clauses. The crisis engendered by these
changes threatened to drive talented people from the boardroom, and fear of this result led a majority of the states to pass
legislation attempting to mitigate the impact of Van Gorkom.34
The resulting "limited liability statutes" are the first of the
three essential sources of director protection evaluated in this
Note.
III.

LIMITED LIABILITY STATUTES

From at least as early as 1967, Delaware has favored officers
and directors over shareholders in the struggle for corporate
control.38 The state derives substantial revenues from this bias.a
It was therefore predictable, but also ironic, that the state which
started the liability furor by handing down the Van Gorkom decision was the first to enact legislation seeking to reduce its effect. Following a year of intensive study and debate, 37 the Delaware legislature passed a limited liability statute38 in June 1986,
and it has become the prototype that other states have emulated. The Delaware statute is the best example of the statutes
existing in most other states. The following sections describe the
Dec. 19, 1985) ($110 million settlement), cited in Galante, The D&O Crisis: Corporate
Boardroom Woes Grow, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 29, col.3.
33. See WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 106.

34. Although there is no express indication that the limited liability statutes are the
direct product of the Van Gorkom decision, such presumption readily obtains. See, e.g.,

Hanks, supra note 7, at 20; Hanks, Update on State Legislative Responses to the Director Liability Crisis, 21 SEc. & CoM. REG. 23 (Feb. 10, 1988).
35. See generally Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation
Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 249 (1976). The chief critic of the apparent bias in
Delaware law has been Professor William Cary. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law, Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). But see Arsht, Reply to
Professor Cary, 31 Bus. LAW. 1113 (1976).

36. Cary, supra note 35, at 663; Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
IncorporationPuzzle, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 225, 240 (1985).

37. See Balotti & Gentile, Eliminationor Limitation of DirectorLiability for Delaware Corporations,12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 9 (1987); Note, Delaware's Limit on Director
Liability: How the Market for IncorporationShapes Corporate Law, 10 HARv. J.L. &

PUB. POL'Y 665, 685-86 (1987).
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
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Delaware law and then discuss the differences found in the liability statutes of other states.
A.

The Delaware Limited Liability Statute

The Delaware statute is an enabling act requiring a decision
by corporate shareholders before its safeguards apply to the corporation's directors. The statute provides:
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in
the certificate of incorporation by subsection (a) of this section,
the certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of
the following matters:
(7) a provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders
for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a
director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate
or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of
the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title;39 or (iv) for any
transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or
limit the liability of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective. All references in this paragraph to a director shall
also be deemed to refer to a member of the governing
body of a corporation
which is not authorized to issue
0
capital stock.4

Several opinions exist regarding the underlying purpose of
and justification for the Delaware statute.41 Some criticize the
law as continuing Delaware's effort to profit from a corporate
39. Section 174 relates to the liability of directors for unlawful payment of dividends
or for unlawful stock purchases or redemptions. It also applies to the exoneration of a
director who dissents from or is absent at the time of such unlawful act, contribution
among directors, and directorial entitlement to subrogation to the rights of the corporation against those receiving the benefit of the above dividend, purchase, or redemption if
such person had knowledge of the illegality. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1983).
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
41. For a discussion of the various schools of thought on the justification for section
102(b)(7), see Note, supra note 37, at 670-81.
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code that is notoriously favorable to management.42 The effectiveness of this policy, to the extent it exists, is indicated by the
twenty-eight percent rise in the number of new incorporations in
Delaware 3 and the $1.4 million increase in proceeds from incorporation fees received in the six months following enactment of
the amendment."
Others respond, however, that, even if the Delaware corporate code benefits the state financially, and even though it is
forged by a "tight little club"'45 of pro-management constituencies in Delaware, nonetheless the freedom given to directors of
Delaware corporations by statutes such as section 102(b)(7) benefits the shareholders and is reflected in the price of the company's stock.46 The purpose of the statute, they assert, is to pro-

tect the entrepreneurial spirit in the corporate boardroom. The
Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State
Bar Association, which proposed the legislation, agrees with the
latter view above that the statute addresses the need for unfet47
tered decision making at the top.

The statute apparently would change the result in Van
Gorkom, which was a shareholder derivative suit for monetary
damages alleging a breach of the directors' duty of care, but not

42. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 35.
43. Franklin, D&O Dilemma: N.Y., Other States Grapple With Liability Issue,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 1987, at 5, col. 3.
44. Id. at 6, col. 2.
45. Cary, supra note 35, at 692.
46. See Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's CorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 916-20 (1982).
47. The synopsis delivered by the Council with the proposed legislation described its
purpose as follows:
Section 102(b)(7) and the amendments to Section 145 represent a legislative response to recent changes in the market for directors' liability insurance.
Such insurance has become a relatively standard condition of employment for
directors. Recent changes in that market, including the unavailability of the
traditional policies (and, in many cases, the unavailability of any type of policy
from the traditional insurance carriers) have threatened the quality and stability of the governance of Delaware corporations because directors have become
unwilling, in many instances, to serve without the protection which such insurance provides and, in other instances, may be deterred by the unavailability of
insurance from making entrepreneurial decisions. The amendments are intended to allow Delaware corporations to provide substitute protection in various forms, to their directors and to limit director liability under certain
circumstances.
Synopsis, S.533, 133d Gen. Assembly § 2 (1986).
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alleging bad faith or self dealing. But as one trio of commentators has described the statute, it "is not, and was not intended
' It is, in fact, narrowly focused.
to be, a panacea for directors."48
First, as mentioned above, the application of the statute is
optional. Even in the Van Gorkom context the statute would be
ineffectual if the shareholders did not vote to include in it the
certificate of incorporation. Furthermore, this shareholder action
need not fully eliminate directorial liability. The shareholders
may choose merely to limit such liability to a specific amount of
money. Second, the statute is prospective only. The shareholder
vote must precede the relevant directorial conduct. Third, because the limitation of liability is determined only by corporate
shareholders and not the legislature, the statute's protection extends only to suits brought by or in behalf of the corporation.
Third party actions are unaffected. Fourth, director misconduct
constituting breach of the duty of loyalty, acts or omissions not
in good faith, intentional misconduct, knowing violation of law,
or improper personal benefit, is expressly excluded from the protection of the statute. Fifth, the statute relates only to actions
for monetary damages. It does not extend to actions for injunctive relief or rescission, nor does it cover attorneys' fees and
other costs of litigation. Sixth, the statute protects only directors. It is of no use to corporate officers. This factor substantially limits the statute's protection of inside directors, who frequently implement policy as officers and determine policy as
directors. Their actions as officers are not shielded by the statute. Accordingly, the limited liability statute affords less protection to directors of the typical closely held corporation, in which
the principals frequently serve as both directors and officers,
than it does to directors of publicly held corporations.
The statute, therefore, by its own language, is significantly
restricted. Perhaps more critical than these readily apparent
limitations, however, will be the judicial determination of the
scope of section 102(b)(7). The statutory language refers to the
"fiduciary duty" of corporate directors. This duty includes both
the duty of loyalty, which precludes a director from realizing an

48. Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a ThreeLegged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399,
403 (1987) [hereinafter Veasey].
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undue personal benefit at the corporation's expense,4 9 and the
duty of care in the performance of directorial duties. 50 Section
102(b)(7) expressly excludes limitation of liability in cases in
which a director breaches the duty of loyalty. Therefore, the "fiduciary duty" mentioned in the statute means only the duty of
care. The statute is also inapplicable if the director's acts or
omissions are intentional, in knowing violation of the law, or not
in good faith. On the lower end of the spectrum, the common
law protects directors from liability in cases of mere negligence.51 Therefore, the focus of section 102(b)(7) is narrowed to
the amorphous realm of culpability that lies between negligence
and intentional wrongdoing, and which is typically characterized
as "gross negligence" or "recklessness."
There is general agreement that the statute was written to
protect directors from liability for gross negligence.5 2 The statute was a direct response to the Van Gorkom opinion. The
court in Van Gorkom affirmed earlier decisions establishing
gross negligence as the standard of care for directors, holding
that the defendant-directors in that case had breached the standard. Therefore, one can reasonably interpret the statutory
phrase "breach of fiduciary duty" to refer to cases of gross
negligence.
It is less certain that acts deemed "reckless" are afforded
the same protection. Most courts view reckless conduct as more
offensive than gross negligence."' Obviously intentional wrongdoing, illegality, and acts of bad faith are also more egregious
than gross negligence. The Delaware legislature, however, did
not include recklessness with illegal conduct, intentional wrongdoing, and acts or omissions not in good faith when specifying
express exclusions from the statute. Practitioners, commentators, and board members, therefore, are left to speculate about

49. See generally Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking &

Business Law, American Bar Association, CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, 33 Bus. LAW.
1591, 1599 (1978).
50. See generally id. at 1600; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984); BLOCK, supra note 1, at 23.
51. 473 A.2d at 812 (clarifying the standard of care required of a director under the
rubric "gross negligence").
52. See, e.g., Veasey, supra note 48, at 402.
53. See supra note 27.
54. W. PROSSER, D. DoBs, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 34 (5th ed. 1984).
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whether recklessness
is bound up in the phrase "breach of fidu55
ciary duty.1

J. Brad Wiggins of the Securities and Exchange Commission
contends that the apparently intentional omission of recklessness50 from the statutory exclusions should allow a corporation
to limit a director's liability for reckless inattention to the duty
of care. 57 Other commentators indicate, however, that such an
allowance depends upon the characterization of a given act by
the court. The authors of one recent article remarked:
To the extent recklessness involves conscious disregard of a
known risk, it could be argued that such an approach is one
not taken in good faith and thus would not be a liability subject to limitation under the new statute. On the other hand, to
the extent recklessness only involves sustained inattention to
duty, it could be labeled "grossly negligent" and
thus any re58
sulting liability would be subject to limitation.
In addition to these questions regarding the judicial application of the duty of care standard, there is some question whether
courts might begin to evaluate cases with a new, broader application of the duty of loyalty. One prominent attorney and commentator has predicted that because of the Delaware statute
"many more cases will be brought under the duty of loyalty theory,"5 9 and some have asserted that the Delaware courts are al-

ready using the term "duty of care" less freely in order to avoid
the effect of the statute.00 While these types of predictions and
interpretations are subject to challenge, they, nonetheless, expose another potential limitation to the Delaware statute and,

55. The problem is perhaps exacerbated by the failure of the Delaware Code to articulate a standard of care for directors. Cf, REv. MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT § 8.30
(1984) (providing that a director shall discharge his duties "(1) in good faith; (2) with the
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in the best interests of the corporation").
56. Cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)(2) (Burns Supp. 1987) (express requirement of
director's willful misconduct or recklessness).
57. Wiggins, Delaware's D&O Liability Law: A "Windfall" for Directors, LEGAL
TiMEs, Aug. 18, 1986, at 11. Note the misnomer, however, in the above title. The Delaware law, applicable only to directors, is not, in reality, a "D&O" law.
58. Veasey, supra note 48, at 403.
59. Franklin, supra note 43, at 6, col. 3 (quoting Joseph Hinsey); see also Hanks,
supra note 7, at 25 n.6.
60. Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Responses to the D&O Insurance Crisis, 19 REv.
SEC. & CoM. REG. 263 (1986).
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therefore, contribute to the continued high cost of D&O
insurance.
B. Variations on the Delaware Model
As of January 1988 thirty-five states had adopted a limited
liability statute. 1 Most states' enactments parallel the Delaware
statute, allowing shareholders to decide whether to limit directorial liability. 2 In some states, however, the statutory protections
exceed those allowed in Delaware.
One method of enhancing a director's protection is to loosen
the standard of liability by requiring a plaintiff to submit proof
of more than a director's simple negligence. Colorado, Florida,
Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin have adopted statutes changing
the standard of liability, and, not surprisingly, the Model Act of
the National Association of Corporate Directors has a similar
provision.6 3 These statutes all require some degree of willfulness
or recklessness. Indiana's statute, for example, requires a showing of willful misconduct or recklessness," and the Ohio law
predicates liability upon proof of "deliberate intent to cause injury" or "reckless disregard for the best interests of the
5
corporation.

6'

Another method of protecting directors is to expand the criteria directors may properly consider in reaching their decisions.
Previously the only legitimate criterion to be considered was the
financial interest of the shareholders.6 Some recently enacted
liability statutes, however, allow directors to consider the interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors, and customers. Others allow directors to base their decisions on the

61. Hanks, supra note 7, at 20.
62. The states with what have been referred to as "Charter Opt-In" statutes are as
follows: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming.

63. MODEL STATUTE STANDARD OF CONDUCT (National Ass'n of Corp. Directors 1973),
reprinted in DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY, May 1987, at 2.
64. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)(2) (Burns Supp. 1987). This statute, unlike most
limited liability statutes, applies to third party suits as well as derivative suits and relates to equitable relief as well as damages.
65. OHfo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
66. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
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state of the national economy, societal considerations, and the
long-term interests of the corporation.6 7 Perhaps the most significant variation of the Delaware statute is a Virginia law that limits the amount of money damages recoverable from a director or
officer in shareholder derivative suits.68 The Virginia statute limits liability for a single transaction, occurrence, or course of conduct to the greater of $100,000 or the cash compensation received by the director or officer in the twelve months preceding
the alleged improper act or omission. 9 Unlike the Delaware
statute, the Virginia law applies without shareholder action
(shareholders can reduce the liability cap, but cannot increase
it), and the only statutory exclusions are for willful misconduct
or knowing violation of criminal or securities laws. Whether the
Virginia law can withstand constitutional scrutiny is debatable,
but it is clearly the strongest legislative effort to date for the
protection of directors and indicates widespread concern about
the D&O liability crisis.
The South Carolina legislature recently passed a statute allowing some corporations to limit the liability of their directors
for breaches of "fiduciary duty," but unlike the Delaware statute, the South Carolina act prohibits companies from eliminating or limiting a director's liability for acts of gross negligence.7 '
The raison d'etre of limited liability statutes has been to shield

67. The Pennsylvania statute, for example, states: "In discharging [their] duties...
directors may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the effects of
any action upon employees, upon suppliers and customers of the corporation and upon
communities in which officers or other establishments of the corporation are located, and
all other pertinent factors." 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987).
Ohio specifically adds that directors may consider "(t]he economy of the state and
nation" and "[t]he long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the
continued independence of the corporation." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Ander-

son Supp. 1987).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(A)(1) (Supp. 1987); see also King, Director Protec-

tion Under Virginia Law, 20 REV. SEc. & Com. REG. 129 (Aug. 1987).
69. The articles of incorporation or the bylaws (with shareholder approval) can contain a provision limiting the liability to zero if desired. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1692.1(A)(1)
(Supp. 1987).
70. See King, supra note 68, at 133 n.40 (citing Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781
(W.D. Va. 1986), which held Virginia's cap on medical malpractice damages
unconstitutional).
71. This provision is part of the new South Carolina Business Corporation Act, 1988
S.C. Acts 444, which will become effective on January 1, 1989. It will be codified as S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-2-402(e).
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directorial acts of gross negligence. It is therefore difficult to discern the intent of the South Carolina legislature.
The South Carolina act, like its Delaware counterpart, uses
the term "fiduciary duty," but the act then whittles away at the
term until it is virtually meaningless. As the discussion above
indicates, the term "fiduciary duty" means both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. 2 The South Carolina statute prohibits
corporations from limiting directors' liability for duty of loyalty
violations. The common law protects directors from duty of care
violations entailing negligence.73 The South Carolina statute excludes duty of care violations that constitute intentional misconduct, acts or omissions not in good faith, or knowing violations
of the law. This conforms with the Delaware pattern. The South
Carolina legislation, however, adds an exclusion for acts of gross
negligence. As a result, the only category of culpability neither
excluded by the statute nor protected by the common law is
recklessness. It seems extremely unlikely that the statute was
drafted to protect directorial recklessness. As mentioned previously, most courts consider recklessness to be more reprehensible than gross negligence. 4 If not intended to address reckless75
ness, however, the statute is apparently meaningless.
IV.

INDEMNIFICATION OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS

State statutes that allow, and in some circumstances require, a corporation to indemnify 6 a director or officer for costs

72. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
73. See supra note 51.
74. See supra, note 54.
75. The statute is also subject to constitutional challenge as being violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. It allows only those corporations
having securities registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under § 12 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, corporations with gross assets in excess of $25 million, and corporations having more than 500 shareholders of any class of stock to "limit"
director liability. Thus, the directors of many smaller corporations are excluded from the
statute.
76. To "indemnify" is, inter alia, "to give security for the reimbursement of a person in case of an anticipated loss falling upon him." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 692 (5th
ed. 1979). An "indemnity" is defined as follows:
A collateral contract or assurance, by which one person engages to secure another against an anticipated loss or to prevent him from being damnified by
the legal consequences of an act or forbearance on the part of one of the parties or of some third person. [The] [t]erm pertains to liability for loss shifted

Published by Scholar Commons, 1988

17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 7

670

[Vol. 39

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

he incurs defending his corporate actions provide the second
source of protection for corporate officers and directors. The following is a brief overview of the history of indemnification followed by a description of the Delaware statute, which is once
77
again indicative of the type of statutes existing elsewhere.
A.

HistoricalOverview

The appropriateness of indemnification has been a subject
of controversy and confusion since the early days of the twentieth century. It continues to arouse debate. 8 On the one hand,
there is longstanding support for the notion that a corporate director or officer who is made to answer in court for good faith
actions taken in his capacity as director or officer should receive
financial support from the corporation to help defend the action.
As early as 1906, for example, the court in Figge v. Bergenthal7
stated that "if no case is made against defendants it is .not improper or unjust that the corporation should pay for the defense
of the action."80
This opinion was far from universal, however, and later judicial decisions required that, before an officer or director could
be indemnified, the court must have concluded that the director's defense of the action provided a "benefit" to the corporation.81 The zenith (or nadir, depending on one's perspective) of
judicial efforts to deny indemnification was the 1933 case of New
York Dock Co. v. McCollom.8

2

In McCollom, the New York Su-

preme Court held that, because a derivative suit is brought on
behalf of the corporation, it is impossible for a corporation to
benefit from the defense of such suit. The court determined that
corporations were not empowered to pay the legal costs of direcfrom one person held legally responsible to another person.
Id.
77. See Veasey, supra note 48, at 404 n.14. See generally Pease, Indemnification
Under Section 145 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 3 DEL J. CORP. L. 167

(1978).
78. See, e.g., Pillai & Tractenberg, CorporateIndemnification of Directorsand Officers: Time for a Reappraisal,15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 101 (1981).
79. 130 Wis. 594, 625, 109 N.W. 581, 592 (1906).
80. Id. at 625, 109 N.W.2d at 592 (1906).
81. See, e.g., Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931); see also J.
BISHOP,

THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 1

5.03 (rev. ed. 1981).

82. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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tors in derivative suits, even if the directors prevailed on the
merits.8"
Two years later, however, the New Jersey Court of Chancery brought the common law full circle by deciding that directors who were successful on the merits in shareholder derivative
suits not only could be indemnified by the corporation but were
"entitled" to indemnification.84 The common law of indemnification had become, as Professor Bishop described it, "a welter of
confusion, sadly deficient in that element of certainty so dear to
the hearts of the corporate bar." 85 To remedy this situation,
New York in 1941 passed the first indemnification statute. 6
87
Soon, all other states followed suit.

The purpose of indemnification statutes, like the purpose of
the liability statutes discussed above, is "to induce capable and
responsible businessmen to accept positions in corporate management." 88 One commentator describes the statutes as efforts to
"seek the middle ground between encouraging fiduciaries to violate their trust, and discouraging them from serving at all."89
The drafters of the 1984 Revised Model Business Corporation
Act (RMBCA) struck a similar chord when stating the goal of
the RMBCA indemnification provisions:
Indemnification provides financial protection by the corporation for its directors, officers, and employees against expenses
and liabilities incurred by them in connection with proceedings
based on an alleged breach of some duty in their service to or
on behalf of the corporation. Today, when both the amount
and the cost of litigation have skyrocketed, it would be difficult
or impossible to persuade responsible persons to serve as directors if they were compelled to bear personally the cost of vindicating the propriety of their conduct in every instance in which
it might be challenged. While reasonable people may differ as
to what constitutes a meritorious case, almost all would agree
83. Id. at 111-12, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
84. Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (N.J. Ch. 1941).
85. J. BISHOP, supra note 81, 1 6.01.
86. Id., 1 6.02.
87. See BLOCK, supra note 1, at 383; W. KNEPPER, LIABILrrY oF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIaECTORS, § 19.04 (3d ed. 1978).
88. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 264 A.2d 358, 360 (Del. Super. Ct.
1970).
89. Johnston, CorporateIndemnificationand Liability Insurancefor Directorsand
Officers, 33 Bus. LAw. 1993, 1994 (1978).
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that corporate directors should have some protection against
personal risk and that the rule of New York Dock Co. v. McCollum [sic] . . . should as a matter of policy be overruled by
statute.9 0
B.

The Delaware Statute

The Delaware indemnification statute is probably the best
example of the statutes currently existing in the various states. 1
It was the prototype for the 1967 version of the Model Business
Corporation Act,92 and at least twenty-five states have similar
statutes.9 3 The Model Act was revised in 1969, 1980, and again
in 1984, but the original Delaware model, with slight variations,
remains the statute most widely used. 4
The first part of the Delaware statute, section 145(a), 95 is
permissive only. Like the early indemnification statutes that
sought to reverse the McCollom decision, section 145(a) grants
corporations the authority to indemnify any person who is sued
because of his status as a director, officer, employee, or agent, or
because of his service at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another corporation. But
the statute requires that the corporation take affirmative steps
before such protection becomes effective.9 ' Section 145(a) applies only to third-party actions instead of actions brought by or
on behalf of the corporation. Accordingly, it allows payment of
attorneys' fees, expenses, judgments, and settlements. The section covers both defendants and plaintiffs 7 in civil actions and
defendants in criminal prosecutions. For a civil litigant to recover under section 145(a) he must have acted in good faith and
in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to

90. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT, Introductory Comment to Subchapter E of
Chapter 8 (1984).
91. See generally Arsht, Indemnification Under Section 145 of the Delaware General CorporationLaw, 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 176 (1978).
92. J. BISHOP, supra note 81, 1 6.02 at 6-6; W. KNEPPER, supra note 87, § 19.07.
93. Veasey, supra note 48, at 404 n.14.
94. Id.; W, KNEPPER, supra note 87, § 19.07 (Supp. 1985).
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983).
96. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text for discussion of the steps a corporation must take to provide indemnification.
97. Cf. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT, §§ 8.51(a) & 8.50(6) (limiting coverage to

defendants or respondents).
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the best interests of the corporation. For a criminal defendant to
be indemnified he must meet these same standards, and he must
also have had no reasonable cause to believe that his conduct
was unlawful.
Section 145(b),98 like section 145(a), is merely an enabling
statute, requiring corporate action to implement its provisions.
But unlike the former section, it relates only to actions brought
by or on behalf of the corporation; it does not apply to thirdparty lawsuits. As a result, the section is more narrow than section 145(a), permitting payment of only attorneys' fees and expenses. Corporate payment of settlements or judgments is not
permitted. The reason for this limitation is grounded in the tautological character of a derivative suit and the inequity to shareholders that would result if a corporation were made to fund
what is essentially its own judgment. The plaintiff in a derivative suit litigates on behalf of the corporation. If he is successful,
the corporation receives the amount of the judgment, and section 145(b) simply recognizes the anomaly that would result if
the corporation also paid some or all of that amount to the directors and officers. 9 Several states have enacted legislation that
overlooks this anomaly and allows the payment of judgments
and settlements in derivative suits, 10 0 but Delaware has yet to
adopt such a policy.
The third section of the Delaware indemnification statute,
unlike section 145(a) and (b), is not merely permissive, but establishes mandatory corporate indemnification for directors, officers, employees, and agents in certain situations. Section 145(c)
provides that:
98. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (Supp. 1986).
99. The current reality of the D&O insurance crisis makes this reasoning less persuasive, even though it is at least superficially reasonable. The ultimate source of protection for a defendant-director who is forced to pay a settlement or judgment in a shareholder derivative suit is the personal reimbursement side of the corporation's D&O
insurance policy. See chart, infra Part VI. The corporation does not pay these insurance
claims directly, but it does pay the premiums for the policies, and premiums can no
longer be considered de minimus corporate expenditures. The average premium for example, paid by a large corporation (over $2 billion in assets) in 1987 for a $25 million
D&O policy was $1,783,296. WYATt SuRvEY, supra note 3, at 96. Clearly, the corporation
is paying substantial sums that are related to derivative suit settlements and judgments
regardless of the inapplicability of the indemnification statute. Therefore, the argument
that a corporation should not fund a derivative suit settlement or judgment by means of
indemnification is not so forceful as perhaps it once was.
100. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:83 (West Supp. 1987).
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To the extent that a director, officer, employee or agent of
a corporation has been successful on the merits or otherwise in
defense of any action, suit or proceeding referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, or in defense of any claim,
issue or matter therein, he shall be indemnified against expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection therewith. 0 1
This section differs from the RMBCA inasmuch as it requires
corporate indemnification "to the extent" the litigant is "successful. ' 10 2 The RMBCA requires that the defendant be "wholly
successful, ' 10 3 which means that the entire proceeding must be
"disposed of on a basis which involves a finding of nonliability.' 1104 Therefore, under the Delaware statute, a criminal defendant who successfully defends several counts against him, but
who is convicted on one count, could require partial indemnification.105 Under the RMBCA he would be entitled to no
indemnification.
Section 145(c) requires indemnification if the defendant is
"successful on the merits or otherwise." If a case goes to trial
and the defendant is exonerated on the merits of the case, he is
certainly entitled to repayment of expenses. Under section
145(c), however, he also has a right to indemnification if his defense is technical, such as a statute of limitations defense. 10 If a
case is settled and dismissed with prejudice and the defendant is
neither required to make payment nor to assume any liability,
then indemnification is appropriate; 10 7 but if the dismissal is
without prejudice, the litigant is not vindicated and the
mandatory indemnification of section 145(c) is inapplicable. 0 8
Before the corporation can pay litigation expenses under
the indemnification statute, an ad hoc determination must be

101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 145(c) (1983).
102. For a discussion of cases dealing with the question of what constitutes "success," see J. BISHOP, supra note 81, 1 6.02[1], at 6-9.
103. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.52 (1984).
104. Id., § 8.52 official comment.
105. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974).
106. See E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 145, at 99-100
(1972); Veasey, supra note 48, at 406; cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (West Supp. 1988)(requiring success "on the merits").
107. Wisener v. Air Express Int'l Corp., 583 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1978).
108. Galdi v. Berg, 359 F. Supp. 698 (D. Del. 1973).
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made pursuant to section 145(d) that the individual is entitled
to indemnification. Section 145(d) requires that:
Such determination shall be made (1) by the board of directors by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors
who were not parties to such action, suit or proceeding, or (2) if
such a quorum is not obtainable, or, even if obtainable a quorum of disinterested directors so directs, by independent legal
counsel in a written opinion, or (3) by the stockholders. 1 9
Whoever evaluates the case must determine whether "indemnification of the director, officer, employee or agent is proper in the
circumstances because he has met the applicable standard of
conduct set forth in subsections (a) and (b) [of section 145]."110

Of course if the litigant seeks indemnification under the
mandatory provisions of section 145(c), the determination would
relate to the extent of his success "on the merits or otherwise."
Section 145(e) of the Delaware statute allows the corporation to advance attorneys' fees and other legal costs to officers
and directors sued for their corporate activities, but employees
and agents are not entitled to such advance payments under the
statute. To receive these funds, the officer or director must make
"an undertaking.

. .

to repay such amount if it shall ultimately

be determined that he is not entitled to be indemnified by the
corporation." ' Because the underlying policy of the indemnification statute is to encourage talented people to serve as corporate officers and directors, section 145(e) is lenient, requiring
neither security for the director's "undertaking" to repay the
money, nor an indication of financial ability to make
reimbursement. 12
The final indemnification section of the Delaware statute,
section 145(f), allows corporate indemnification beyond the
scope of the statute by means of a contract, bylaw, or resolution.
Section 145(f) provides:
The indemnification and advancement of expenses provided by, or granted pursuant to, the other subsections of this
section shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to
109. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (1983).

110. Id.
111. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (Supp. 1986).
112. See Veasey, supra note 48, at 411.
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which those seeking indemnification or advancement of expenses may be entitled under any bylaw, agreement, vote of
stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to
action in his official capacity and as to action in another capacity while holding such office.113

The scope of this nonexclusive provision is uncertain; no
cases have addressed the issue. 114 One commentator states that
"[n]obody knew what the clause meant in the old statutes, and
if anyone knows what it means in the new ones, he has not published the information."11 The limited case law in jurisdictions

other than Delaware indicates a judicial inclination to interpret
nonexclusive clauses restrictively,"1 ' and to be guided by public
policy considerations. 1 7 It is unlikely, therefore, that a director
who has breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation could be
indemnified under section 145(f).11 8

V. D&O INSURANCE
The third, and in many instances, the most important
source of protection for officers and directors of large, publicly
held companies 19 is D&O insurance. 120 First marketed by
113. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (Supp. 1986).
114. Veasey, supra note 48, at 413.
115. J.BISHOP, supra note 81, l 6.03[1].
116. Block, Barton & Radin, Indemnificationand Insurance of Corporate Officials,
13 SEC. REG. L.J. 239, 248 (1985).
117. See Arsht & Stapleton, Delaware's New General CorporationLaw: Substantive Changes, 23 Bus. LAw. 75, 80 (1967); Sebring, Recent Legislative Changes in the
Law of Indemnification of Directors, Officers and Others, 23 Bus. LAW. 95, 105 (1967).
118. Veasey, supra note 48, at 414.
119. The prevalence of D&O insurance is greater in large corporations and in publicly held corporations than in small or privately held corporations. For example, 96.8%
of all New York Stock Exchange listed companies have D&O insurance and 87.8% of
corporations with assets of $100 million to $1 billion have the insurance; but only 42.4%
of closely held companies and 34.7% of companies with $10 to $25 million in assets
maintain D&O coverage. WYA'rr SURVEY, supra note 3, at 51, 52.
The reasons companies cite for not carrying the insurance are as follows:

See No Need For It
Advice of Counsel
Cost Too High
Coverage Too Limited
Unable To Obtain Coverage
Other

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss3/7

1984

1987

58%
13%
12%
5%
5%
14%

26%
9%
39%
14%
18%
13%
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Lloyd's of London in the mid-1950s,"2 ' the insurance, at least
theoretically, fills the interstices between indemnification statutes, common-law protections, and limited liability statutes. The
relationship between these sources of protection is addressed in
Part VI below. This Part provides
an overview of the primary
122
characteristics of a D&O policy.

A. Policy Structure
Because of the early prominence of Lloyd's of London,123 its
forms of policies still dominate the D&O market.124 The most
widely accepted policy, with a name only an insurer could loveALS(D4)-ALS(D5)' 25-was issued first by Lloyd's in 1974. After
substantial criticism was leveled at the form for its "tortuous
and opaque language and ambiguities,"' 26 it was revised in 1976.
The new form, "Lyando No.1, 1

27

was less ambiguous, but be-

cause it resolved most ambiguities against the insurers, it was
not met with substantial enthusiasm by corporate America, and
Id. at 55.
120. Most states expressly authorize the purchase of D&O insurance by statute. The
Delaware statute, § 145(g) of the Delaware Corporate Code, states:
A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on
behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the
corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director,
officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture,
trust or other enterprise against any liability asserted against him and incurred
by him in any such capacity, or arising out of his status as such, whether or not
the corporation would have the power to indemnify him against such liability
under this section.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1983).
121. Comment, Void Ab Initio: Application Fraudas Grounds for Avoiding Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Coverage, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 929 n.1 (1986).
122. For a comprehensive treatment of the characteristics of D&O insurance, see
Miller, An Analysis of Key Policy Provisions of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, in STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO THE D&O INSURANCE CRISIS 58 (Law &
Bus. 1986); see also Malen & Evans, Surviving the Directors' and Officers' Liability
crisis:Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 439 (1987).
123. Currently Lloyd's underwrites only 5-6% of the U.S. D&O insurance. WYATT
SURVEY, supra note 3, at 107.
124. J. BISHOP, supra note 81, 1 8.02.
125. A complete discussion of this policy and a copy of its full text can be found in
Johnston, supra note 89.
126. J. BISHOP, supra note 81, 8.02.
127. For a thorough evaluation of the Lyando No.1 policy, see Hinsey, The New
Lloyd's Policy Form for Directors and Officers Liability Insurance-An Analysis, 33
Bus. LAw 1961 (1978).
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the previous Lloyd's policy remains the most representative
form in use. No perfect example of a D&O policy exists because
many variations occur on a company-by-company basis. 12 8 The
following, however, is an attempt to give the general framework
within which most policies are written.
D&O policies are usually in two parts. The first part, the
"personal coverage" section, provides direct insurance to the directors and officers of the company. The insuring clause of this
portion of the Lyando No.1 policy is as follows:
In consideration of the payment of the premium ... Underwriters agree(A) to pay to or on behalf of the DIRECTORS and OFFICERS of the COMPANY LOSS arising from any claim
or claims made against the DIRECTORS and OFFICERS, jointly or severally, during the Policy Period
...by reason of any WRONGFUL ACT done or attempted or allegedly done or attempted by the DIRECTORS and OFFICERS
during or at any time prior to the
129
Policy Period.
Because of the prevalence of corporate indemnification, relatively few directors and officers incur defense costs personally, 130 and the majority of claims are made under the second
part of the policy, the "corporate reimbursement" section.' In
the insuring clause of this portion of the Lyando No.1 policy, the
underwriter agrees:
to pay to or on behalf of the COMPANY LOSS arising from
any claim or claims made against the DIRECTORS and OFFICERS, jointly or severally, during the Policy Period by reason of any WRONGFUL ACT done or attempted or allegedly
done or attempted by the DIRECTORS and OFFICERS during or at any time prior to the Policy Period, but only when the

128. Miller, supra note 122, at 59.
129. Hinsey, supra note 127, at 1981.
130. The level of corporate reimbursement of directors' and officers' defense costs is
not entirely certain. Recent increases in deductibles for personal coverage are quite low
vis-a-vis those increases reported for the corporate reimbursement portion of D&O policies. WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 75 (indicating a substantially greater incidence of
corporate reimbursement claims filed than personal coverage claims filed). It is, nonetheless, estimated that in one of every four D&O lawsuits the individual officer or director

bears some portion of the defense costs personally. Id. at 18.
131. Miller, supra note 122, at 61; WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 18, exhibit 11.
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COMPANY shall be required or permitted to indemnify the
DIRECTORS and OFFICERS for such LOSS pursuant to statutory or common law or pursuant to duly effective charter or
by-law provisions.1 32
Neither portion of a D&O policy insures the corporation itself for its direct liability to a plaintiff or the expenses of defending a lawsuit. This factor creates problems when a plaintiff
wins a judgment against both the corporation and its directors
or officers in a single action. Assuming the defendants are jointly
and severally liable, they can theoretically pay the judgment by
whatever method of apportionment they choose. Therefore, if
the judgment is within the limits of the D&O policy, the directors could pay the entire judgment and be reimbursed by the
company, which in turn could demand payment under the corporate reimbursement section of the D&O policy. If, however,
the corporation paid the judgment directly, it would have no
claim for the insurance money. In such circumstances, the ability of the corporate entity to shift its liability to the insurer by
means of collusion with its directors and officers is clear, and
courts have been receptive to the argument that judgments
should be allocated to the various defendants in such cases.1 33
The burden of proving that portions of the judgment are not
3
covered by the D&O policy, however, lies with the insurer.1 4
B. Definitions
Defining the highlighted terms within the two insuring
clauses above is critical in determining the scope of a D&O insurance policy. The terms "directors" and "officers" typically include previous, current, and future directors and those officers
appointed by action of the stockholders or the board of directors, including directors and officers of both the parent company
and its subsidiaries.1 3 5 The definition of these terms will be expanded or narrowed in many policies, with a concomitant ad-

132. Hinsey, supra note 127, at 1981-82.
133. See Pepsico, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 662 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)(joint tortfeasors may demand contribution from each other in securities fraud
case).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Hinsey, supra note 127, at 1982; Miller, supra note 122, at 64.
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justment of the premium, to fit the particular situation."' 6
The definition of the term "loss" is also critical to the scope
of the policy. Under the Lyando No.1 policy, a loss means "any
amount a DIRECTOR or OFFICER is obligated to pay in respect of his legal liability. . . for a WRONGFUL ACT. 1 37 Loss
entails costs, charges, expenses, damages, judgments, and settlements related to the investigation of or defense of claims before
judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies.138 The definition of
loss does not, however, include fines or penalties resulting from a
criminal proceeding.1 39 Interestingly, these fines and penalties,
which D&O insurance will not reimburse, are subject to corporate indemnification, assuming the executive acted in good faith
and in a manner he reasonably believed to be both not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation and not criminal. Therefore, although insurance generally covers a broader range of activity than indemnification, in some instances the indemnification statute protects the director or officer and insurance does
40
not.1
Also excluded from the definition of "loss" is any matter
that is "uninsurable" as a matter of law.11 The term "uninsurable" is not defined in a typical D&O policy and has been the
source of some dispute. 142 Whereas some courts have held that
14 3
intentional wrongdoing and even criminal activity is insurable,
others have found the contrary.14 4 Professor Bishop states that
"[t]he prevailing rule seems to be that insurance against at least

136. Miller, supra note 122, at 65.
137. Hinsey, supra note 127, at 1982-83. The term "wrongful act" is defined as follows: "[Any actual or alleged breach of duty, neglect or error or accountability of the
DIRECTORS or OFFICERS as DIRECTORS or OFFICERS or any actual or alleged
misstatement, misleading statement or other act or omission by the DIRECTORS or
OFFICERS in their respective capacities as DIRECTORS or OFFICERS." Id. at 1983;
see also Miller, supra note 122, at 72.
138. Hinsey, supra note 127, at 1982-83. Notice that this definition should include
SEC and IRS proceedings, grand jury probes, and legislative hearings. Miller, supra note
122, at 69.
139. Hinsey, supra note 127, at 1983-84.
140. See, chart, infra Part VI, box 44.
141. Hinsey, supra note 127, at 1983-84.
142. See generally J. BisHop, supra note 81, 8.03[1].
143. Colson v. Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1968); Wolff v. General
Casualty Co., 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961).
144. Portaro v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 210 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Ohio),
af'd; 310 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1962).
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compensatory damages is permissible even when the insured's
wrongdoing was deliberate. The validity of insurance against punitive damages is more doubtful."14 5
C. Limitations on Liability
Reimbursement under a D&O insurance policy typically has
been limited by "co-insurance" and "deductible" provisions. Coinsurance clauses require that the insured provide five percent
of the total costs related to a claim, while deductibles are negotiated amounts that the insured must pay before- insurance becomes available. The trend of insurers has been to drop the relatively insignificant co-insurance provisions and boost deductibles
enormously. 1"1 Approximately seventy percent of D&O policies
no longer have co-insurance provisions,'14 but the increase in the
typical deductible has more than compensated for the loss. Between 1984 and 1987, the average deductible on the corporate
reimbursement side of a D&O policy increased an astounding
1,326% from $51,646 to $736,290.1' s
D. Exclusions
D&O policies can now also include a daunting array of exclusions which deny insurance coverage in particular circumstances. The exclusions are split between the corporate reimbursement side and the personal coverage side. 4"
The corporate reimbursement section typically excludes
claims actually paid by any other insurance policy, claims covered (whether actually paid or not) by prior insurance policies,
claims based on bodily or personal injury, and claims based on
violations of the Employer Retirement Income Security Act of
1974. Most policies 1 50 also include a specific exclusion of claims

145. J. BISHOP, supra note 81, 8.03[1](emphasis in original). Compare Greenwood
Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 316, 232 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1977)
(permitting insurance for punitive damages) with Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 116
Cal. App. 3d 374, 379, 172 Cal. Rptr. 59, 65 (1981) (denying, for public policy reasons,
insurance against liability for punitive damages).

146.

WYATT SURVEY,

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 75.
Miller, supra note 122, at 79.
Approximately 80% of D&O policies currently carry a pollution exclusion. Wy-

supra note 3, at 79.
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arising from environmental pollution, even though pollution
claims would likely be covered by bodily injury or property damage policies and would be filed against the corporation itself instead of its officers and directors.1 51 Insurers are simply taking
additional precautions to avoid the potentially enormous liability of pollution claims.
On the personal coverage side of the policy, reimbursement
is excluded if the directors and officers are indemnified by the
corporation, or if the claim against them is for libel or slander,
personal gain, unauthorized remuneration, short swing profits in
violation of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
152
or dishonesty.
In addition to the these commonplace exclusions, insurers
are beginning to insert exclusions that in toto would effectively
render the policies worthless. For example, some policies now
exclude claims arising from merger and acquisition activities, responses to tender offers, and violations of securities regulations
in addition to the standard 16(b) exclusion. These exclusions are
not typical, being reported respectively by only thirteen, fifteen,
and twenty-five percent of companies with D&O policies. 15 3
These exclusions, however, and others like them 54 represent a

ATr SURVEY, supra note 3, at 68.

151. For further discussion of liability related to pollution, see Comment, Corporate
Officer Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal: What Are The Consequences?, 38 MERCER L, REV. 677 (1987).
152. For a broader discussion of these exclusions see Miller, supra note 122, at 79.
153. WYATT SURVY, supra note 3, at 68.
154, The Wyatt Company reports that the following exclusions currently exist in the
percentage of policies indicated:

Exclusion
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Pending or prior litigation
Going private
Public Offerings
Securities transactions
Failure to maintain insurance
Joint ventures
Partnerships
Illegal payments or commissions
Actions by regulatory agencies
Litigation between insureds

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss3/7

Percentage of
companies reporting
policies with
the exclusion
70%
2%
5%
19%
49%
12%
12%
51%
18%
28%
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growing and menacing phenomenon in the D&O market.
E.

Cancellation

In addition to high premiums, high deductibles, numerous
exclusions, and shrinking coverage facing corporate executives,
the possibility of losing the insurance altogether also exists. Illustrative of the problem is the following chain of events reported in the National Law Journal in August 1986:
The directors of Unocal Corp. thought it was bad enough
when they learned last year that corporate raider T. Boone
Pickens, Jr. might attempt a hostile takeover.
Then they learned the really bad news. The day after Mr.
Pickens revealed his purchase of 7.9 percent of Unocal's common stock, the company was notified that its directors' and officers' liability insurance was being canceled.' 5
Unfortunately, this scenario is not surprising. D&O insurance is
written on a "claims-made" basis, requiring that notice of a
claim be given to the insurer during the policy period and must
relate to "wrongful acts" occurring during or prior to the policy
period. 156 If events transpire making it likely that directors and
officers will be sued, therefore, it is in the insurer's interest to
cancel the policy. Currently, 57% of all D&O policies can be
canceled with thirty days' notice, and 86.6% with sixty days'
notice. 57
Under earlier interpretations of the business judgment rule,
a corporate takeover attempt such as Pickens's pursuit of Unocal mentioned above, might not have caused great concern
among insurers. Today, however, a director walks a treacherous
path in resisting, rejecting, or even approving a takeover offer.
In Van Gorkom, for example, the directors of Trans Union Corporation, who ultimately became liable for approving the sale of
the company at $55 per share, were advised by James Brennan,
an attorney retained by Van Gorkom to review the proposed
merger, that if they did not accept the Pritzker offer, they might

WYATr SURVEY,

supra note 3, at 68-69.

155. Galante supra note 32, at 1, col.4.
156. See Miller, supra note 122, at 75.
157. WYATr SURVEY, supra note 3, at 70.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1988

31

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol.

39

be sued for their failure to act. 158 This sort of directorial "Catch22" and the specter of canceled insurance has made life at the
top considerably less enticing.
VI. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIMITED LIABITY
STATUTES, INDEMNIFICATION STATUTES, AND D&O INSURANCE

To appreciate the protection-or lack thereof-currently afforded a corporate officer or director, it is useful to analyze the
coordination between the three forms of protection discussed
above. The chart below attempts to display the salient features
of these relationships graphically, with explanations of each segment of the chart following. Undoubtedly, the subtleties of director and officer protection cannot all be relegated to a single
chart. This chart, therefore, is only a guide and is drawn with
the following assumptions in mind:
1. That the hypothetical company is incorporated in
Delaware.
2. That the company has indemnified and limited the liability of its directors and officers to the full extent allowed by law.
3. That the company maintains a typical D&O insurance
policy, and that no specific exclusion applies to any of the circumstances discussed.

158. 488 A.2d at 868.
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Does the Is IndemLimited
nification
Liability
Allowed
Statute
by State
Protect the Statute?
Defendant?

I. Civil Actions:
A. Actions Not Brought by or in
Behalf of the Corporation:

2

1. Fees & Expenses
2. Settlements & Judgments
B. Actions Brought by or in Behalf
of the Corporation (Usually
Shareholder Derivative Suits)
1. Fees & Expenses
2. Settlements
3. Judgments Based on Breach
of Duty of Care
a. Defendant Was Negligent
b. Defendant Was Grossly
Negligent

4. Judgments Based on Breach
of Duty of Loyalty

10

Yes/No

21

11

19

Yes

22 No

23

26

27

No

34

12

D&O(CR)

16 LL or D&O (P)
20

No

No
30

D&O(CR

1
Yes

No

No

Yes

15
No

Uncertain

D&O(CR)
8

Yes

Yes

29

33

Yes

18

17

4

7

14

13

Ultimate
Source of
Protection*

Yes

Yes

No

25
c. Defendant Was Reckless
d. Defendant's Acts Were
Intentionally Wrong,
Illegal, or Not in Good Faith

3

6

No

Does D&O
Insurance
Cover the
Defendant?

Yes

No

9

685

Yes

CL, LL
24

LL

28
D&O (P)

Yes
31

32

No

Possibly

D&O (P)

No

35 Yes/Noj136

D&O (P)

II. Criminal Actions
37
A. Fees & Expenses

38
No

41
B. Fines & Penalties
III.Miscellaneous

42
No

45
A. Amounts Less than D&O Deductible
B. Advancement of Expenses Prior to
Final Adjudication or Settlement
C. Protection for More than
Directors (i.e., Officers,
Employees, Agents)

No
57

Yes

65

Yes

56

I, or
D&O(C.R.)

60
D&O (P)
64

63
No
67
No

I, or
D&O(C.R.)

Yes

Yes
66

Yes/No

55

59

62

I
52

Uncertain

Yes

No

48

51

58

61

F. Violation of Certain
Securities Laws

54

I

No

Yes

Depends

E. Insurer Refuses to Pay

47

50

D&O(C.R.)
44

No

Yes

No

D. Corporation is Unable or Unwilling to Indemnify the Defendant

43

46

49

40
Yes

Yes

No

53

39
Yes

68
Yes

I, or
D&O(C.R.)
D&O(P) or
D&O(C.R.)

*Sources of Protection: LL = Limited Liability Statute
I = Corporate Indemnification
D&O (P) = D&O Insurance, Personal Coverage Section
D&O (C.R.) = D&O Insurance, Corporate Reimbursement Section
CL = Common Law
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The following outline corresponds with the outline at the left margin of the chart above and is intended to serve as something of a
roadmap. All code sections refer to the Delaware CorporateCode.
I. Civil Actions
A.
Actions Not Brought by or in Behalf of the Corporation.
The division of the "Civil Actions" category into third party
suits (Subsection A) and derivative suits (Subsection B) is
primarily to indicate the limitations many state
indemnification statutes place on the reimbursement of
settlements and judgments in derivative suits (see boxes 14,
18, 22, 26, 30 and 34) as opposed to third party suits (box
6).
1. Fees & Expenses
a. Box 1
Section 102(b)(7) only refers to a director's
liability to the corporation or its shareholders, so
a director would not be protected by the limited
liability statute from fees and expenses in third
party suits.
b. Box 2
Section 145(a) relates to third party actions and
permits indemnification for expenses. Section
145(c) requires indemnification of expenses if the
defendant is successful on the merits or
otherwise.
c. Box 3
For purposes of D&O insurance there is no
distinction between third party actions and
derivative suits. These fees and expenses (to the
extent they exceed the D&O deductible) would be
covered by insurance.
d. Box4
Although indemnification is available, the
corporation would be reimbursed under the
"corporate reimbursement" side of the D&O
policy, so insurance is the ultimate source of
protection.
2. Settlements & Judgments
a. Box 5
Same as Box 1, above.
b. Box 6
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Section 145(a) permits indemnification and
section 145(c) requires indemnification if the
defendant is successful. The defendant must have
acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably
believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best
interests of the corporation.
c. Box7
This is similar to box 3, above; D&O insurance
would cover these settlements or judgments.
d. Box 8
Like the situation discussed at box 4, above, D&O
insurance (the corporate reimbursement side) is
the ultimate source of protection even though
indemnification is available
B. Actions Brought by or in Behalf of the Corporation
(Usually Shareholder Derivative Suits)
1. Fees & Expenses
a. Box 9
Section 102(b)(7) relates only to monetary
damages assessed against a director. It does not
cover the fees and expenses that he incurs
defending the action. Of course, to the extent
monetary damages assessed against the director
include the fees and expenses of the plaintiff, the
statute does provide protection.
b. Box 10
Section 145(b), relating to suits brought by or in
the right of the corporation, permits
indemnification for fees and expenses, and section
145(c) requires indemnification if the defendant is
successful.
c. Box 11
The typical D&O policy expressly covers general
costs, costs of investigation, and amounts
incurred in the defense of legal actions.
d. Box 12
Having indemnified the defendant, the
corporation would be reimbursed under its D&O
policy.
2. Settlements
a. Box 13
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Section 102(b)(7) protects a director from his

3.

negligent or grossly negligent acts, with respect to
actions by or in behalf of the corporation. For the
plaintiff to recover there must be an intentional
act, a violation of the law, a breach of the duty of
loyalty, or (perhaps) directorial recklessness.
The payment of a settlement is, to some degree,
an admission of one of these bases of liability,
and by the very payment of the settlement, it is
clear that the statute did not protect the
defendant. The statute would, however, help a
merely negligent or grossly negligent directordefendant avoid payment of a settlement. This
"settlement" category was placed on the chart to
point out the distinction between fees-expenses
and settlements in derivative suits with respect to
indemnification statutes rather than to make such
distinction with respect to liability statutes.
b. Box 14
In actions brought by or in behalf of the
corporation, sections 145(b) and (c) allow
indemnification for only fees and expenses, so
indemnification
is not available to pay
settlements or judgments in these cases. Some
states, however, have begun to eliminate this
limitation on indemnification.
c. Box 15
One of the primary purposes of D&O insurance is
to protect directors and officers in shareholder
derivative
suits in
which corporate
indemnification is unavailable.
d. Box 16
As indicated with regard to box 13, the limited
liability statute would in some cases be the source
of protection. Otherwise, it would be provided by
D&O insurance. Because indemnification is not
available, the insurance payment would be based
on the personal side of the D&O policy.
Judgments Based on Breach of the Duty of Care
a. Defendant Was Negligent
i. Box 17
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Aronson v. Lewis' 59 established that a director
did not breach his duty of care if he was merely
negligent. 60 So a defendant does not need the
limited liability statute to protect him in cases in
which he is negligent. The common-law rule
already protects him. Because the statute covers
the same cases, however, the proper response in
Box 17 is "Yes."
ii. Box 18
Same as box 14, above.
iii. Box 19
D&O insurance would cover the defendant but
the common law, as discussed at box 17, above,
should prevent liability.
iv. Box 20
The sources of protection for a director against
liability for his acts of negligence are both the
common-law standard articulated in Aronson and
the limited liability statute.
b. Defendant Was Grossly Negligent
i. Box 21
The limited liability statute was drafted
specifically to address this situation, allowing a
corporation to eliminate or limit directorial
liability for monetary damages in derivative suits
based on the director's gross negligence.
ii. Box 22
Same as box 14, above.
iiii. Box 23
D&O insurance would cover the defendant, but
the limited liability statute, by denying the
plaintiffs judgment, should make such coverage
unnecessary.
iv. Box 24
The director is protected by the limited liability
statute when a director's gross negligence is at
issue.

159. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
160. Id. at 812. By specifically establishing gross negligence as the standard of care
for directors, Aronson clarified the standard that had been described variously in previous cases. See id. at 812 n.6.
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c. Defendant Was Reckless
i. Box 25
Recklessness is a level of culpability between
gross negligence and intentional wrongdoing, and
the effect of the statute is uncertain.
ii. Box 26
Same as box 14, above.
iii. Box 27
D&O insurance extends to directorial
recklessness.
iv. Box 28
D&0 insurance is the source of coverage, and
because corporate indemnification is not
permissible, reimbursement would be based on
the personal side of the D&O policy.
d. Defendant's Acts Were Intentionally Wrong, Illegal,
or Not in Good Faith
i. Box 29
Section 102(b)(7) expressly excludes this type of
directorial malfeasance.
ii. Box 30
Same as box 14, above.
iii. Box 31
There are too many variables here to give a
definitive answer. D&O policies define covered
"losses" to exclude liability that is "uninsurable"
as a matter of public policy, but the scope of the
term "uninsurable" is anything but precise. Fines
and penalties in criminal actions are expressly
excluded from coverage in D&O policies, but
expenses in criminal actions can be insured.
Whether intentional acts or those acts not in good
faith can be insured are issues that have been
decided differently in different jurisdictions.
Notice that the enabling provision for D&O
insurance, sectiJn 145(g), allows the purchase of
insurance "whether or not the corporation would
have the power to indemnify . . . ." This
provision, however, does not allow one to
disregard the public policy considerations
discussed above.
iv. Box 32
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If the director can be protected in this instance,
D&O insurance will be the source of protection.
See note at box 31, above.
4. Judgments Based on Breach of Duty of Loyalty
a. Box 33
Section 102(b)(7) expressly denies protection for
breach of the duty of loyalty.
b. Box 34
Same as box 14, above.
c. Box 35
D&O insurance covers a director's breach of duty.
Many of the acts of a director that constitute
duty of loyalty violations (actions resulting in
personal gain), however, are specifically excluded
from coverage in most D&O policies.
Theoretically D&O insurance can protect a
director in this instance, but in practice it seldom
does.
d. Box 36
See note at box 35, above. To the extent coverage
exists the source of reimbursement would be the
personal side of the D&O policy because of the
unavailability of corporate indemnification.
II. Criminal Actions
A. Fees & Expenses
1. Box 37
Section 102(b)(7) relates to civil, not criminal,
actions.
2. Box 38
Section 145(a) allows corporate indemnification of
a director who is a criminal defendant if the
director acted in good faith, in a manner he
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the
best interest of the corporation and if he did not
have reasonable cause to believe that his actions
were criminal
3. Box 39
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Although there is some difference of opinion
among cases, some courts have upheld the
validity of policies covering liability for criminal
misconduct. One prominent commentator states
that "any cost that is lawfully indemnifiable is
also 'insurable."'" Under section 145(a), a
corporation may indemnify a criminal defendant
who acted in good faith, in a manner he
reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to,
the best interests of the corporation, and without
reasonable cause to believe his actions were
criminal. In such cases, therefore, D&O insurance
should be available.
4. Box 40
Assuming insurability (see box 39, above), the
corporate reimbursement side of the D&O policy
would be the ultimate source of protection
because it would reimburse for the corporation
indemnifying the director.
B. Fines & Penalties
1. Box 41
Section 102(b)(7) relates to civil, not criminal
actions.
2. Box 42
Same as box 38.
3. Box 43
D&O policies expressly exclude from the
definition of a covered loss fines and penalties in
criminal actions.
4. Box 44
Section 145(a) (corporate indemnification) is the
only source of protection from payment of
criminal fines and penalties.
III. Miscellaneous
A. Amounts Less Than D&O Retentions
1. Boxes 45-48

161. J. BISHOP, supra note 81, 1 8.031].
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To the extent of D&O deductibles, the cost of
litigating or of paying settlements or judgments is
covered by corporate indemnification alone."6 2
B. Advancement of Expenses Prior to Final
Adjudication or Settlement
1. Box 49
Section 102(b)(7) does not relate to expenses.
2. Box 50
Section 145(e) allows advancement of expenses
from the corporation to a director or officer, but
not to employees or agents.
3. Box 51
Courts are split on the question whether D&O
policies - none of which expressly undertake to
pay expenses in advance - contain an inherent
obligation of the insurer to defend the insured." 3
4. Box 52
Depending on the applicable judicial rule (see box
51, above), the source of this interim protection is
either corporate indemnification or D&O
insurance. The insurance would ultimately cover
these costs, so this category only refers to the
short term out-of-pocket expenses
C. Protection for More Than Directors
1. Box 53
Section 102(b)(7) expressly covers only directors.
2. Box 54

162. The Wyatt Company reports that the average deductible in 1987 was $37,766
on the personal coverage side of the policy. This is the aggregate maximum deductible
for personal coverage claims against all of the directors and officers covered. The average
deductible for a single director or officer was $7,292. The average deductible in 1987 was
$736,290 on the corporate reimbursement side. WYATr SURVEY, supra note 3, at 75.
163. See Mallen & Evans, supra note 122, at 449; Oettle & Howard, D&O Insurance: Judicially Transforming a "Duty to Pay" Policy into a "Duty To Defend" Policy,
22 TORT & INs. L.J. 337 (1987); Comment, PracticalAspects of Directors' and Officers'
Liability Insurance-Allocatingand Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend, 32
UCLA L. REv. 690 (1985).
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Section 145(a) and section 145(c) respectively
provide
permissive
and
mandatory
indemnification for directors, officers, employees
and agents, but section 145(e) precludes
advancement of expenses to employees and
agents.
3. Box 55
As indicated by the name, D&O policies generally
relate to directors and officers only. Section
145(g) allows a corporation to extend coverage to
other employees or agents, but the premium
would rise accordingly.
4. Box 56
The ultimate source of protection is typically:
a. Directors: D&O insurance
b. Officers: D&O insurance
c. Employees: Post hoc indemnification
d. Agents: Post hoc indemnification
D. CorporationIs Unable or Unwilling to Indemnify
the Defendant
1. Boxes 57-60
If a corporation is unable because of bankruptcy,
for example, or unwilling because of corporate
takeover, with hostility between the new and old
management, for example, to indemnify its
directors, and assuming the directors' culpability
exceeds gross negligence, thereby rendering the
limited liability statute useless, the director
would nonetheless be protected by D&O
insurance.
E. Insurer Refuses to Pay
1. Box 61-64
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Along with the rise in D&O judgments and
settlements that have imposed large liabilities on
executives has come an equivalent increase in the
number of insurers denying coverage under their
policies.'" Many of these attempts have been
unsuccessful, but others have succeeded. Even if a
court eventually forces the insurer to pay a claim,
the insured's interim protection will have been
corporate indemnification. If the court upholds
the insurer's positon, both the interim and the
ultimate source of protection will be
indemnification.
F. Violation of Certain Securities Laws
1. Box 65
If a director breaches his fiduciary duty by the
grossly negligent violation of the securities laws,
the limited liability statute bars civil liability.
2. Box 66
In order to promote the in terrorem effect of the
securities laws, many courts deny indemnification
of liabilities
incurred under some securities
165
laws.

3. Box 67
All D&O policies expressly exclude coverage for
violations of section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (short swing profits). The
Wyatt Company, reporting what it calls a "serious
erosion of coverage," also indicates that twentyfive percent of D&O policies exclude SEC
violations in addition to 16(b) violations, and
nineteen
percent
exclude
securities
transactions. 66

164. One factor cited with some frequency by insurers as a reason for nonpayment
of claims is alleged misrepresentations by insureds in filing applications for insurance.
Directors and officers are typically asked whether they have knowledge of any acts or
omissions that might give rise to a claim under the policy, and deceptive responses to
such questions have resulted in the voiding of some policies. See Comment, supra note
121, at 930.
165. For a discussion of this topic, see W. KNEPPER, supra note 87, 1 19.06; Block &
Barton, Contribution and Indemnification Under the Federal Securities Laws, 11 SEc.
REG. L.J. 351 (1984).
166. WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 68.
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The "yes" response on the chart is to indicate
that even in jurisdictions not allowing
indemnification for securities laws violations, a
corporation can negotiate D&O insurance
coverage for such acts. The extent of protection
under a7 prototype policy, however, is not entirely
1

clear.

1

4. Box 68
Depending on whether corporate indemnification
is allowed in the jurisdiction for the particular
statutory violation in question, the ultimate
source of protection will either be the personal
coverage side of the D&O policy (if no
indemnification) or the corporate reimbursement
side (if corporation indemnifies defendant).

VII. THE

PROSPECT FOR INSURANCE RATES TO COME

The Van Gorkom opinion'68 was the catalyst in the decision
of many states to adopt limited liability statutes. Those statutes,
barring an unanticipated treatment by the judiciary, will likely
prevent a ruling like Van Gorkom in those jurisdictions. The
broader D&O insurance crisis, however, stems from a variety of
sources, and is not so easily reversed. This section cites six factors, which either helped create this insurance crisis or which
will tend to perpetuate the current high cost of insurance, indicating that substantial rate reductions in the future are.
unlikely. 69

167. See J. BISHOP, supra note 81, 8.03[2][b].
168. See supra text accompanying notes 17-34.
169. The reasons cited here for the high level of D&O premiums necessarily entail a
degree of speculation or extrapolation. One writer depicts the "information crisis" regarding D&O insurance as follows:
The insurance industry does not have a centralized body of experience data
from which to make underwriting decisions-which risks to undertake to cover
and at what price. For example, the Insurance Services Office (ISO), the principal statistical and advisory organization for commercial lines of insurance, does
not provide any advisory services with respect to directors and officers liability
insurance, which is considered a "specialty line." If the ISO were providing
services for this coverage, they would provide advisory information, rules,
forms, and classifications. The lack of such information increases the importance of highly specialized underwriting expertise and reduces the number of
companies that feel qualified to provide this coverage.
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The Insurance Industry

Van Gorkom and other cases resulting in huge judgments or
settlements against directors and officers came at a time when
the insurance industry was least prepared to absorb them. Six
years of price wars relating to all lines of insurance had left insurers particularly vulnerable to large claims.' The insurance
companies, eager to invest the money they received in premiums
at the high money market rates of the early 1980s, cut prices in
order to attract whatever premiums they could.7 7

Earning

twenty percent or more on their investments, the companies remained blissfully indifferent to a growing gap between premiums
received and claims incurred. When interest rates fell and claim
frequency rose the insurers sought to recover in premiums what
they were previously earning through their investments. The result was an explosion in the cost of insurance to the consumer.
As indicated at the outset, from 1984 to 1987 the cost of an average D&O policy jumped from $19,339 to $243,011.172

Whereas the vulnerability of the insurance industry contributed to this price explosion, there is no indication that D&O insurers are currently losing money. In fact D&O insurers as a
group may have never been unprofitable. It is difficult to reach a
definitive conclusion on this issue because much of the information relating to the insurance industry is not available to the
public.' 73 Acquiring accurate information regarding D&O insurance is even more difficult because of its relatively minor place
in the insurance market. 7 4 It is intriguing, however, to consider
the claims of several commentators, who contend, without discussing D&O insurance specifically, that the insurance companies have made handsome profits through the worst of the insur-

Jones, D&O Insurance Info Breakthrough:1987 Wyatt Company Survey Released, Di.RECTOR'S MONTHLY, Sept. 1987, at 7.
170. Hilder, supra note 10, at 1, col.6; Note, The Illinois Legislature's Attempt to
Resolve the Insurance Crisis: Too Much Tort Reform and Too Little Insurance Regulation, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 159, 162 (1987).
171. The authors of one article refer to this practice as "cash flow underwriting."
Mallen & Evans, supra note 122, at 442; see also The Manufactured Crisis, CONSUMER
REPORTS 544 (Aug. 1986); Note, supra note 170, at 162.
172. See supra notes 4-14 and accompanying text.
173. Note, supra note 170, at 159 n.3.
174. See supra note 169.
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Their conclusions are supported by studies of

governmental agencies 176 and perhaps more convincingly by the
17
performance of insurance company stocks in the stock market.
The reentry of at least one major insurer, Home Insurance Company,1 78 into the market in 1986 and the first-time entry of two
major commercial carriers, Aetna Life & Casualty Group and
Commercial

Credit

Group,17 9

are

further

indications

of

profitability.
Evidence also indicates that primary insurance rates have
begun to stabilize, 80 and excess premiums have actually
dropped in 1986.181 Both factors indicate that the losses of insur-

ers, if in fact they ever existed, are coming under control. Therefore, the overextended position of the insurance industry in the
mid-1980s, while contributing to the crisis initially, should not
be a continuing problem.
B.

The Corporate Environment

At the same time that insurance companies were engaged in
their rate war, corporate activities were becoming more likely to
result in litigation challenging directorial judgment. A proliferation of corporate mergers and acquisitions beginning in the late
1970s created circumstances in which directors were called upon
to make quick decisions of tremendous scope, decisions similar
to the one that confronted the Trans Union directors in Van
Gorkom. s2 Also, from July 1984 to October 1987, the great bull

175. See, e.g., Schroeter & Rutzick, "Tort Reform"-Being an Insurance Company
Means Never Having To Say You're Sorry, 22 GONZAGA L. REV. 31, 36-39 (1986); The

Manufactured Crisis, CONSUMER REPORTS 544 (Aug. 1986).
176. See, e.g., Schroeter & Rutzick, supra note 175, at 37.
177. See Note, supra note 170, at 163 n.37.
178. WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 106.
179. Id. at 162.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 92.
182. This statement presumes that the directors in Van Gorkom were indeed faced
with the necessity of making a quick decision. One can certainly argue that the sense of
emergency surrounding the weekend board meeting in Van Gorkom was manufactured
by Jay Pritzker, and to a lesser extent Jerome Van Gorkom, to discourage an escalation
of the price. If the time pressure in this case had not been so artificial perhaps the result
would have been different. On the other hand, the directors were told by counsel that
their failure to accept the Pritzker bid-a bid with a very short time limit-could result
in personal liability for the directors. 488 A.2d at 868. Even if the time constraints were
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market on Wall Street inflated stock prices, and this situation,
according to at least one securities litigator, caused prices to
drop more drastically when news of directorial malfeasance was
released.' 83 Like the overextension of insurance companies, however, the corporate environment might be less of a problem in
the near future. Merger and acquisition activity, while still
healthy, is not as prevalent as in the early eighties, and the euphoric stock market environment has been dramatically altered
by the "crash" of October 1987.
C. Diversity of D&O Claims
The diverse nature of D&O claims has contributed to the
crisis initially and will probably continue to have an effect. The
Wyatt Company predicts that one out of every five Fortune 500
companies experienced a D&O claim in 1987 and that the average total claim cost for D&O claims brought in 1986 will be
$2,567,000 when final figures are tabulated. 8 4 The most common
claims reported are predictable. They are, in order: misleading
representations (21%), breach of employment contract (14.2%),
breach of duty to minority stockholders (13.9%), and civil rights
violations (13.9%).185 More startling is that eighty-three types of

claims in addition to the four listed above were reported in the
Wyatt Company's 1987 survey. 18 6 With such diversity of claims,

it is no wonder that exclusions are proliferating and prices remain high. The insurers cannot safely predict the source of future claims.
D. The Nature of Limited Liability Statutes
Another reason for the continuing high cost of insurance is
the limited impact of the various limited liability statutes. First,
roughly thirty percent of the states have not passed legislation
limiting director liability. Second, of the statutes that have been
passed most are narrowly focused, covering only monetary dam-

artificial,
183.
184.
of direct
185.
186.

therefore, the directors were still under pressure.
Galante, supra note 32, at 29, col2.
WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 11. The term "total claim cost" means the sum
damages and legal defense costs. Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 17, 31.
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ages assessed against a director in a shareholder derivative
suit. 1817 The Wyatt Survey indicates that over sixty percent of

D&O claims stem from sources other than shareholder derivative suits; 18 and average defense costs-payable regardless of
the defendant's ability to avoid monetary damages-amount to
$281,684 per claim."8 " So the existing statutes leave some significant loopholes and protect directors in only a narrow set of circumstances. Last, even if a case falls within the ambit of the
statute as written, it is not entirely clear that a court will apply
the statute.19 0 Many duty of care cases also include duty of loyalty questions,' 9 and several commentators fear continuing liability under the rubric duty of loyalty for what are essentially
duty of care violations. 192 So limited liability statutes, while reducing the likelihood of director liability under certain circumstances, are not the entire solution to high insurance rates.
E. The Nature of D&O Insurance Policies
Three aspects of D&O policies themselves, or in one instance the judicial interpretation of such policies, also affect
rates in ways not immediately apparent. First, the operation of
the corporate reimbursement side of the policy has an effect.
The chart in Part VI above reveals that, except in relatively minor or temporary ways, D&O insurance underwrites corporate
indemnification. When a corporation indemnifies its directors
and officers, the ultimate source of funds is usually the corporate
reimbursement portion of the company's D&O insurance, not
the corporate coffers.
Second, despite provisions to the contrary in most policies,
courts have interpreted D&O insurance to entail a duty to pay
the defense costs of directors and officers in addition to the payment of insured losses. 9 3 This judicial posture causes insurers to
187. See supra text accompanying notes 48-61.
188. WYATr SURVEY, supra note 3, at 28.

189. Id. at 25.
190. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986);
AC Acquis. Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del.Ch. 1986).
192. See supra note 59.
193. See Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 795 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a D&O insurer was obligated to pay the costs of insureds' defense at the time when
the costs were incurred despite contractual language stating only that "[tihe Insurer may
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advance funds earlier than would otherwise be necessary, encourages defendants to contest claims that they might otherwise
settle, and can result in the payment by the insurer of costs not
actually insured. The insurer can benefit from this judicial policy when its early involvement in the lawsuit helps to reduce the
cost of the ultimate claim, but in at least one case, the court
both required the insurer to advance funds for the directors' defense and precluded the insurer from participating in the lawsuit.""' The insurer's opportunity to reduce the total cost of the
claim was therefore eliminated. From the insurer's standpoint,
financial responsibility for a lawsuit without control of its defense clearly increases the prospects for higher costs.195
A third aspect of D&O policies that helps account for continuing high premiums is the limited application of exclusions.
At first blush, one might read a list of D&O policy exclusions
and wonder whether any activities of directors and officers are
actually insured after the exclusions are applied. The list of potential exclusions is long and continues to grow. In practice,
however, relatively few of these exemptions can be found in any
given policy. The introduction of exclusions relating to mergers
and acquisitions, for example, is a disturbing new phenomenon,
but such exclusions are currently included in only thirteen percent of D&O policies. 9 ' Similarly, exclusions relating to tender
offers are found in only fifteen percent of the policies.197 This is
not to imply that exclusions are not seriously eroding the coverage previously offered. They are. D&O policies are negotiable,
however, and the number and type of exclusions varies substantially from policy to policy. Many of the potential exclusions will
not be present in a given policy, and the fewer the applicable
exclusions, the higher the D&O premium.

at its option. . . advance on behalf of the Directors or Officers... expenses which they
have incurred"); Pepsico, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 640 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); see also authorities cited supra note 163.
194. Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 383 (D. Haw. 1985), afj'd in relevant part, 795 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1986).
195. Not all courts have ruled against the insurer in "duty to defend" cases. See,
e.g., Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 651 F. Supp. 474
(N.D. Okla. 1986) (allegations required adjudication in order to determine whether
claims were insured).
196. WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 68; see also supra note 154.
197. WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 68.
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F. Public Policy
Finally, although many steps have been taken to protect
corporate executives, public policy requires managers of corporations to be responsible for their corporate actions. Like many
other corporate battles, the current D&O crisis is a struggle between conflicting policies. s8 On one hand, corporate directors
and officers need freedom to exercise their entrepreneurial skill.
Without adequate autonomy, corporate executives cannot take
the measured risks that spur the growth of great businesses. On
the other hand, these executives manage what is frequently a
vast fortune in trust for corporate shareholders; some restraint
on their latitude is only appropriate. 9 Accordingly, the limited
liability statutes discussed above must be narrowly focused, and
the indemnification of directors and officers must be limited.
States cannot hold directors completely harmless without radically altering the nature of corporations, or the nature of society
itself. A balance must be struck between director autonomy and
shareholder protection, and D&O premiums simply reflect the
current status of the conflict between these two policies.
VIII. ALTERNATIVES
The D&O crisis has caused many companies to seek new
means of protecting their directors. Commentators have identified five alternative methods of addressing the D&O problem.2 00
Two of these, the broadening of indemnification statutes and the
enactment of limited liability statutes, have been discussed at
length in this Note. Their capacity for relieving the crisis is sub198. One author states:
[P]ower corrupts. It can be turned to the personal use of the wielder of power
in ways that hurt the other persons having claims on the organization. The
problem, then, is how to keep managers accountable to their other-directed
duties while nonetheless allowing them great discretionary power over appropriate matters. This is the major problem dealt with by corporate law.
R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.5, at 33-34 (1986).
199. Similar balancing of interests is required with regard to the actions of public
officials, and the immunity of such officials is apparently on the wane. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). For a comparison between the liability and immunity of government officials and corporate officials, see Pillai & Tractenberg, supra note 78, at 12628.
200. See Block, Barton, & Garfield, Advising Directors on the D&O Insurance Crisis, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 130 (1986).
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ject to challenge, as indicated in section VII above.
The third alternative is for a company to establish a wholly
owned or "captive" insurance company to provide insurance for
the parent company's directors and officers. While perhaps more
attractive than having no insurance or paying the high cost of
the current open market D&O policies, captive insurance raises
a host of problems, many of which have not been addressed by
the courts. Of primary concern is whether a captive insurance
company adequately spreads the risk of loss, and therefore
whether it is insurance at all, or merely a form of indemnification.201 If a court determines that the captive insurer merely indemnifies the present corporation, then the propriety of the insurance would presumably be tested under the indemnification
statute, which is more narrow than most insurance policies.0 2
Another problem with captive insurance is that policy premiums
might not be deductible for federal income tax purposes,
whereas standard D&O premiums are deductible. 0 Therefore,
the wisdom of creating a captive insurance subsidiary is
doubtful.
A better alternative is the formation of a self-insurance pool
among a group of companies. This sort of pooling spreads the
risk of loss, thus avoiding the "indemnification" problem of captive insurers. Also, whatever premiums are paid qualify for deductibility under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code,
making a pooling arrangement clearly preferable to a captive insurance scheme.
One problem with insurance pooling, however, is access. The
most noted insurance pool, for example, was formed by thirtythree prominent corporations, including IBM, Ford Motor Company, General Electric, and U.S. Steel. 0 4 Obviously, this is an
exclusive club. Other pools exist, however, 20 5 and to the extent a

company can gain access to or create a new pool, this alternative
could alleviate the corporation's D&O insurance problem. The

201. Veasey, Finkelstein, & Bigler, supra note 60, at 266.
202. Indemnification statutes, for example, do not allow indemnification in shareholder derivative suits, except for fees and expenses. See chart supra part VI.
203. Block, Barton, & Garfield, supra note 200, at 144; Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B.
53.
204. Block, Barton, & Garfield, supra note 200, at 145-46.
205. See Tilton, Director and Officer Liability Insurance: What To Look for in
1988, DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY, Oct. 1987, at 1, 2.
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ability of the managers of insurance pools to predict accurately
the cushion of protection needed, given the vagaries of the current D&O marketplace, and to provide adequate protection at
rates lower than those of the standard D&O carriers is, however,
open to question. 206
The fifth method of addressing the insurance crisis is
through loss prevention.2 0 7 Corporations should develop programs to identify practices and situations likely to result in
claims against directors and officers. Executives should be educated about their legal responsibilities, and companies should
implement programs to avoid D&O claims or mitigate the resulting losses when they are inevitable. As the authors of a recent
article stated, however, "'[f]oss prevention' is not a science, it is
barely an art. 2 08 The effectiveness of loss prevention in the executive suite is not as easily quantified as it is in the factory.
Nonetheless, the stakes are high for companies unable to acquire
or afford the desired level of insurance coverage, and loss prevention programs could be a major line of defense for some
companies.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The D&O insurance crisis emanates from a variety of causes
and, accordingly, is unlikely to subside without substantial
changes in the corporate environment. Triggered by such varied
phenomena as the insurance premium wars of the early eighties,
increased merger and acquisition activity among corporations,
and a spate of lawsuits successfully challenging directorial discretion, the crisis, like a cancer, defies simple treatment. In
many states limited liability statutes address a prominent segment of director and officer liability, but these statutes are narrowly focused and will not have a significant impact on D&O
insurance rates. The other source of director protection, corporate indemnification, is rarely the ultimate source of protection
since it tends to provide only interim assistance to the director
until an insurance claim can be filed. While this indemnification

206. Block, Barton, & Garfield, supra note 200, at 146.
207. For a thorough discussion of loss prevention, see Mallen & Evans, supra note
122, at 468.
208. Id, at 468.
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is important to directors and officers, it does little to ease the
burden on D&O insurance. Limited liability and indemnification
statutes have perhaps enhanced the availability of D&O insurance, and the current stabilization of insurance rates could reflect the impact of these statutes. The statutes, however, have
not effected, and will not effect, substantial reductions in D&O
premiums. They are drafted too narrowly and leave too many
questions unanswered.
Public policy as it relates to corporations requires that corporate officials bear the responsibility for their actions. Until directors and officers become error free, or judges scrutinize executive decisions with less exaction, or state legislatures immunize
directors and officers from liability, D&O insurance will continue
to be the primary source of director protection, and D&O premiums will continue to be high, reflecting the current societal balance between shareholder rights and directorial prerogative.
John A. Cottingham
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